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INSTITUTIONS FOR WATER MANAGEMENT
IN A CHANGING WORLD
IRVING K. FOX*

Since the inception of the Conservation Movement in North
America the legal and administrative arrangements for managing
water resources have been given nearly as much consideration as the
policies to guide water development and use. While initially the
emphasis was upon law and organization structure, about 1950 the
politics of water development and use began to receive an increasing
amount of attention.1 This interest in the law, administration and
politics of water resources has been prompted largely by a desire to
strengthen the instruments we have used for managing water resources.

The term institution is used in a variety of ways.2 In this paper the
term institution refers either to an entity; an organization or an
individual, or a rule; a law, regulation, or established custom. An
institutional arrangement is defined as an interrelated set of entities
and rules tha serve to organize societies' activities so as to achieve
social goals. Each nation has an institutional arrangement for managing water resources. This arrangement establishes the conditions
under which water resources can be developed and used and provides
organizations and individuals with certain resources and authorities
to carry out prescribed tasks. The purpose of this paper is to explore
the nature of the problem of developing suitable institutions for
water resources management.
This paper does not focus upon the institutional problems of a
particular country although the illustrative material is drawn from
the United States and Canada where the writer has lived and worked.
The aim is to provide a perspective on institutional design that might
be useful in thinking about institutional problems in water management in any country.
THE GENERAL NATURE OF WATER MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS

As noted above, the general purpose of water management institu*Director, Westwater Research Centre, University of British Columbia.
1. E.g., A. Maas, Muddy Waters (1952). Since that date numerous other books and
articles have appeared: V. Ostrom, Water and Politics (1953); R. Martin, River Basin
Administration and the Delaware (1957); H. Hart, Dark Missouri (1957).
2. See, N. Wengert, The Concept "Institutions" in Water Management Usage (1973).
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tions is to organize the provision of water services so as to accord
with the collective wishes of society. This task is complicated by the
fact that members of society have different priorities with regard to
the use of a given supply of water. While the same supply may serve
more than one use, there is nevertheless competition among potential
uses and users. The institutional framework must provide some way
of reconciling the differing objectives of people so that decisions can
be made about how the water will be utilized and who will use it. It
must also facilitate the faithful implementation of policies decided
upon. This leads to the basic components of an institutional framework for water management which are:
1. The entities that establish the rules or laws about how water
may be developed and used-usually legislative bodies supplemented by regulatory agencies.
2. The rules or laws governing the development and use of water.
3. The entities that participate in deciding what water development and use programs will be undertaken.
4. The entities that implement the development and use programs
decided upon.
Experience has demonstrated that a number of distinct groups will
have an interest in how a given water supply is developed and used.
These interests may be classified into three categories; namely the
sectoral, the organizational, and the regional groups. The sectoral
groups relate to the different uses that may be made of the same
supply-domestic users, irrigation water users, hydro-electric power
developers, transportation users, recreation users, etc. The organizational interests are the bureaucratic entities concerned with the
development and use of the resource. These may parallel the sectoral
interests. The department of agriculture will tend to have interests
similar to those of the irrigators and the department of transportation will have interests similar to those of the transportation enterprises. The organizational and parallel sectoral interests will differ
somewhat in their objectives because organizations develop their own
goals. Since water development may affect a local or regional
economy, groups may organize which transcend the sectors affected,
as they have in so many parts of the United States. It is evident,
therefore, that even if an organization is established which is responsible for all planning, development and management of a water
resource, these separate interests will exist with their differing objectives.
Each of these interest groups concerned with a given water
resource may be thought of as a cybernetic system. Its values or
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objectives tell it what type of information is relevant *tothe decisions
it must make; it receives information which aids it in judging the
consequences of alternative decisions; it applies its value framework
to this information 3which indicates the course of action that will best
serve its objectives.
Each of the entities concerned with the use of water resources
receives information from the other entities involved. For example, a
fisheries organization may learn that an electric power organization
proposes to build a dam at a given location. The fisheries group may
in turn advise the canoeists who wish the river maintained as a free
flowing stream. The fisheries and canoeing organizations may form a
coalition and advise the electric power organization that they will
oppose the construction of the dam before the legislative body.
Thus, in even a simple case information flows from one organization
to another and this information enters the cybernetic system of each
entity and helps it determine the course it will pursue. Each entity
takes into account the position of all other entities and estimates the
implications of the positions of these other entities for the course it
should follow in order to achieve its own goals.
The important point is that in water management, decisions are
seldom made by a single entity. Instead the decision process may be
characterized as eco-systemic in nature, the decision is a consequence
of the interactions of many entities.4 The influence of each entity on
the final decision will depend upon a number of factors including the
rules which govern what it can do, its capability to generate information, and its ability to impose burdens or provide benefits to other
entities concerned with the decision. In a democratic society these
influences are balanced out by elected representatives who legitimatize a decision. The product of this set of interactions should be
the preference of society. It is essential to keep in mind that the
eco-systemic character of water management decision processes
cannot be avoided. Even if a river basin authority is established the
process cannot be completely unified because it is impossible to
establish a single organization that can embrace all facets of water
management and use.
As Haefele5 has demonstrated, in a democratic society the elected
representative can be in the best position to weigh the priorities of
the different groups to arrive at a decision that reflects the social
will. The task of institutional design is to secure a distribution of
resources among groups and a set of rules governing their behavior
3. K. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, ch. 5 (1966).
4. E. Dunn, Economic and Social Development (1971).
5. E. Haefele, Representative Government and Environmental Management (1973).
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which will produce decisions that do in fact reflect the desires of
society. The section which follows specifies a set of criteria for institutional performance, which, if met, will produce results that accord
with the social will.
SOCIAL VALUES AND PERFORMANCE CRITERIA FOR
WATER MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS
Since the function of institutions is to facilitate the realization of
social goals, it is necessary to ask what the social goals of water
management are and then to consider what they imply for the
development of performance criteria for use in assessing water
management institutions.
Water resources provide a variety of services and the social goals of
water development might be expressed in terms of these services.
Thus a social goal might be to provide an adequate supply of clean
water to meet the domestic needs of the population or to provide a
supply of water for all lands that can be irrigated economically.
Water development has also been viewed as an instrument for achieving goals that extend well beyond the services that water provides.
For example, in the United States public hydroelectric power
development has been viewed as a means of regulating the performance of privately owned electric power companies. In many
parts of the world, river basin development has been undertaken to
stimulate general economic advancement. In these areas a social goal
of water resources management is the stimulation of economic
development.
One might try to assess institutional performance in terms of its
relative success in achieving either direct or instrumental goals of the
type that have been described. However, for important reasons, it is
not appropriate to judge institutional performance in this fashion.
For one thing, a political jurisdiction seldom adopts precisely defined
goals. As Braybrooke and Lindblom 6 have emphasized, people can
agree more easily on what to do than upon what goals should be
achieved. Of even greater importance goals of the foregoing type
change and one of the important functions of institutions is to adjust
the course being pursued in accord with the changing priorities of
society. Since performance cannot be assessed in terms of goals, we
must make our assessment in terms of the process by which the
course of action is decided upon. This in fact is the way we have
always judged institutions. In North America and Western Europe we
have appraised governmental institutions in terms of their democratic
6. D. Braybrooke & C. Lindblom, The Strategy of Decision (1965).
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processes and effectiveness, not in terms of the policies implemented.
Similarly we do not judge economic institutions in terms of the price
placed upon commodities but in terms of the process by which the
price has been determined. In short, members of society hold values
which determine what processes are acceptable. Fortunately there is
greater agreement on values that determine what processes are
acceptable than there is upon the policies in question. Thus, the issue
with regard to institutional design is what values does society hold
which determines how instifutions should function. Social values
determine what constitutes a suitable process for making social
decisions. It is suggested that the following social values are important in the establishment of performance criteria for water
management institutions:
a. The criterion of representation of legitimate interests. The priorities of a referent group recognized by society as legitimate
should determine what policies or courses of action are adopted.
In a democratic society the referent group is the public at large.
In an elitist society, this group is the recognized elite. The value
frameworks of members of the referent group determine which
alternatives are relevant and what information is required for
decision making. A choice is the consequences of negotiations
and bargaining among groups that are a part of the legitimate
interests in accord with accepted rules of the game. This leads to
the following performance criterion; the value frameworks of
legitimate interest groups should determine which alternatives are
considered and what information is generated. Each legitimate
interest group should be able to be represented in the negotiations that lead to a decision.
b. The criterion of adequacy of information. Decisions should be
based upon good information about the consequences of alternative courses of action determined to be relevant by the value
frameworks of members of society. Good information is that
which can be produced in a reasonable time with reasonable
resources. It should include feedback from experience within the
system and the results of experience external to the system. It
should reflect innovative efforts.7
c. The criterion of efficiency. The system should not be wasteful of
time and resources in making and implementing decisions.
d. The criterion of effectiveness. Decisions that are made should be
faithfully implemented; the implementing actions should not
depart from the objectives of the decisions that are adopted.
It is argued that an institutional arrangement should produce
policies that result in efficient use of water and other resources. This
7. V. Thompson, Bureaucracy and Innovation (1969).
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view is rejected because negotiations among interest groups may well
produce compromises which result in an inefficient use of resources.
Who is to say that the benefits from the compromise do not exceed
the costs stemming from the inefficiencies involved?
Therefore, in assessing the performance of institutional arrangement for water management, i.e. the network of organizations and
rules involved in decisions about water use, the foregoing set of four
criteria will be used. It is concluded that these are valid criteria
because they reflect values to which people generally adhere. If the
procedures followed in arriving at and in implementing programs
meet these criteria, the programs are presumed to be good. It is
evident that performance cannot be measured in precise fashion but
it is believed that the criteria specified provide a basis for asking
searching questions about the performance of any institutional
arrangement.
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FACTORS
There are a large number of factors that must be taken into
account in designing an institutional system which will meet the
performance criteria outlined above. For purposes of this analysis
these factors are subdivided into three groups, which will now be
examined.
Physical Characteristicsof Water Resources
There are a number of physical characteristics of water which
determine how it can be economically utilized and which in turn
have implications for the design of institutional arrangements. Since
these have received a great deal of attention in the literature in water
resources management, they will not be examined in detail. 8 They
include the interdependencies among uses which create external
economies and diseconomies that must be taken into account if
efficient use of water resources is to be realized. Some water services
such as flood control, cannot be conveniently subdivided into units
for sale and purchase. There are economies of scale in water development which results in most water development activities being
characterized as natural monopolies. Some water services tend to be
public goods which means that a pricing system designed to recover
costs may not achieve efficient use. And some services of water, i.e.
water as a general environmental amenity, are non-marketable. The
design of water resources institutions must take into account these
8. J. Krutilla & 0. Eckslem, Multiple Purpose River Development 52-70 (1958); Irving &
Craine, OrganizationalArrangementsfor Water Development, 2 Nat. Res. J. 1 (1962).

October 19761

INSTITUTIONS FOR WATER MANAGEMENT

characteristics if water is to be developed and utilized so as to realize
the most benefits practicable.
It is noteworthy in particular that the allocation and evaluative
mechaniss of a competitive enterprise system are not well suited to
realizing maximum benefits from water development because many
water developments are natural monopolies. Externalities must be
considered. Some services cannot be divided into units for purchase
and sale, and for those water services which are public goods, prices
which maximize benefits will tend not to recover the costs of development. Thus, the powers of government must be utilized to
design institutions which will function effectively in light of the
physical characteristics of water resources.
The General Structure of Government
Water resources institutions must be designed to accord with the
general governmental structure of the country.
Water management cannot be separated from the remainder of the
national institutional structure. While there is physical unity in the
river basin, the system that provides water services must be related to
similar services provided by the remainder of the economy. Through
flood control and irrigation, the water management system increases
agricultural output. Hydroelectric facilities provide energy. Every
nation has non-water institutions which are concerned with agriculture, energy, transportation, and recreation. These sectoral interests
cannot be expected to neglect the role of water resources in providing sectoral services. As a consequence, water management institutions cannot avoid being part of the complex institutional structure
of the nation with numerous interactions among the various entities
concerned with the services that water can provide. The kind of
water management institutions which will achieve this coordination
most effectively will depend in part upon the general structure of
government in the country in question. A number of contrasting
situations will serve to illustrate the nature of the institutional problem under different governmental systems.
A. A Federal Versus a Unitary System
In a federal system, authority over water management is divided
between the national government and the state or provincial governments. The nature of the division varies widely. In the United States,
the authority of the national government is virtually paramount
whereas in Canada and West Germany the provinces and states have a
more powerful voice in water resources matters. The significant point
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is that under a federal system in which both levels play a substantial
part in water development, the institutional structure will tend to be
more complex than under a unitary system. In a federal system there
will be sectoral agencies at each level; agriculture, energy, fisheries
and transport, and both sets of agencies must be a part of the network of water management institutions. It is important to recognize
that these interactions cannot be avoided and that institutional
design must aim to facilitate communication among the entities
involved.
B. A ParliamentaryVersus a CongressionalSystem
Using the experience of the United States as an example, the
Congressional system of government can require more complex water
management institutions than the parliamentary system. In the parliamentary system, the supremacy of the cabinet establishes a clear
hierarchy of authority and responsibility. Under the congressional
system, agency officials must concern themselves with two channels
of authority. Thus an agency may secure Congressional authorization
for a project that is disapproved by the President, or it may receive
congressional guidance on plicy that contravenes the directives of a
department head. In the United States, members and committees of
Congress are important components of the institutional network
whereas under the parliamentary system members and committees of
parliament do not play as significant a part.
C. A Democratic Versus an Elitist System
What is democratic and what is elitist is a matter of definition. In
this paper, the definition of democracy used by Mayo is followed. 9
A democratic government is one in which those responsible for the
decisions of government are popularly selected in free elections. An
elitist government is one in which the powers of government are
exercised by a designated select portion of the population. Countries
in which a single party controls the government, as in communist
countries, are referred to as elitist.
The significant point with regard to institutional design for water
management is that the institutional problem confronted in elitist
countries is quite similar to that faced in democratic countries. The
differences are largely in detail and procedure. In both elitist and
democratic governments a range of interests must be taken into
account and channels of communication are required so that different interests are considered. In each case water management
9. H. Mayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory 61-69 (1960).
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activities must be coordinated with the agricultural sector, the energy
sector, the transportation sector etc. Channels of communication
must be established with these several sectors. Since the referent
group is different in the two systems, procedures for determining the
value frameworks to be taken into account in identifying alternatives
and evaluating proposed courses of action will be different. In a
democratic government procedures may be necessary for communication between agencies and elected representatives or the
public at large. In an elitist government such communication will be
between the agencies and those who can speak legitimately in behalf
of the elite, such as members of the ruling party.
The foregoing observations have sought to emphasize the importance of designing the institutional system to accord with the general
framework of government in the country involved. In every case
there will be a network of organizations. There will tend to be more
organizations in the network if the country is federal instead of
unitary. The way the legislative body is part of the network will vary
between a parliamentary and a congressional system. Since values are
determined by the referent group, an elitist society must make provision for contact with a different group than a democratic society in
determining what values to be applied in the identification of alternatives to be considered.
ORGANIZATIONAL AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
Institutional design for water management must take into account
certain features of political and organizational behavior. This is a
large and complex topic in itself so it is not practicable to examine
these features in a comprehensive fashion. The following are only
suggestive of the kind of behavioral aspects that must be taken into
account.
A. Agency-Clientele Relationships
There are two points to be made with regard to this factor. First,
an agency tends to identify with the interests it serves and to assume
similar objectives. An agency responsible for flood control will tend
to identify with the property owners whose lands are being protected
and a fisheries agency will tend to identify with the fishermen. This
means that the values and objectives of other interests affected will
tend to be neglected unless there are countervailing influences
brought to bear upon the agency. Second, a regulatory body tends to
favor the objectives of the organizations it regulates.' I Thus a pollu10. R. Nail, Reforming Regulation (1971).
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tion control agency tends to sympathize with the problems of the
waste dischargers and give greater weight to the objectives of the
waste dischargers than to other interests affected.''
B. Agency-Clientele Relationships
The education and experience of agency personnel tends to determine the way an agency perceives problems and how such problems might be resolved. Thus, if an organization is dominated by a
particular profession, such as biologists, engineers, or economists, the
program of the agency will tend to reflect the special perceptions of
the profession. Engineers will tend to emphasize structural solutions,
biologists will stress preservation of the ecological system, and the
economist will be concerned about efficiency. If a reasonable balance
is to be achieved, provision must be made in institutional design for
influences to offset the perceptions of a particular profession.
C. The Power of Organized Interests
It has been demonstrated that well organized interests have a
much larger influence on public decisions than an unorganized body,
even though the unorganized group may have as large a total stake in
the decision as the organized group.' 2 For example, the beneficiaries
of an irrigation project will have the motivation to organize and
promote the project, whereas the taxpayers who will bear the cost do
not have the motivation to organize and oppose it. The reason is that
each beneficiary has sufficient stake in the project that he has the
motivation to help organize support for the project whereas each
taxpayer has so little stake in the decision that he cannot afford to
organize to oppose it. Thus, it is difficult to design water management institutions which represent faithfully the interest of large
unorganized groups that collectively may have a large interest in a
water management program. As Lowi has pointed out, this behavioral characteristic tends in a democratic society toward support of
distributive policies;' I policies in which benefits are distributed to
particular groups at the expense of the general taxpayer.
STRENGTHENING WATER MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS
It is evident from the foregoing analysis that there is no simple
formula for designing suitable water management institutions. The
issue is now how to design an organization to manage the develop11. M. Holden, Pollution Control as a Bargaining Process (1966).
12. M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 165-67 (1965).
13. Lowi, FourSystems ofPolicy, Politics and Choice, 32 Pub. Ad. Rev. 298 (1972).
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ment and use of water resources. Instead, the issue is how to design
an interacting system of entities and rules, and a communication
network in light of the physical characteristics of water, the general
structure of government, and the nature of organizational and
political behavior, that will meet the performance criteria specified in
this paper. Since water management is the result of the activities of a
group of interacting cybernetic systems, the critical elements determining the performance of the system are data inputs and the value
frameworks. The value frameworks of members of the referent group
must determine what information is generated and the identification
and evaluation of alternatives. Sufficient resources must be available
to produce the data required for informed decisions.
Common InstitutionalDeficiencies
This examination of institutional deficiencies is based upon
general observations of experience in Canada and the United States.
A significant conclusion from these observations is that the difficulties that have been encountered do not stem from a failure to
recognize the requirements that result from the physical characteristics of water. In the United States there is only one major type
of situation in which the physical characteristics of water resources
are not taken into account in institutional design and this relates to
ground water. In most states water allocation law fails to recognize
the physical relationship between underground and surface
sources.' "I The major deficiencies in institutional design stem from a
failure to take into account in a fully satisfactory fashion the need to
consider the interactions among the network of entities concerned
with water management and the nature of organizational and political behavior.
Experience in the United States and Canada suggest that there are
three categories of problems that are the most difficult to overcome.
These relate to the representation of legitimate interests, the adequacy of information and effectiveness of implementation practices.
Each of these problems are examined below.

A. Representation of Legitimate Interests
In a competitive enterprise system, interests are represented
through the processes of the market. The seller expresses his interest
through the price he asks for his services and the buyer expresses his
14. J. Sax, Water Law, Planning & Policy, ch. 5 (1968).
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interest through the price he is willing to pay. In democratic political
theory interests are expressed through the ballot box, with elected
representatives taking into account the interests of their constituents.
However, with the development of a bureaucracy consisting of
agencies which have their own objectives, another layer of interests
becomes involved in the processes which lead to decisions. These
government agencies become important elements of the political
system. They have their own motivations and take a direct and active
part in the negotiating processes.
In the United States several factors have militated against a
balanced representation of interests. Of foremost importance has
been the fact that financial and staff resources to investigate and plan
large scale water resources projects have been concentrated in a
limited number of agencies in a given situation. In most specific
situations a single agency, the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of
Reclamation, the Soil Conservation Service, or the Environmental
Protection Agency, has dominated the planning activity. These
agencies have generally been oriented to a particular clientele, and
for the most part the perceptions of professional engineers have had
a paramount influence over their activities. Since other interests have
not been equipped with resources to investigate and analyze alternatives that they considered to be relevant, these other interests have
tended not to be well represented in the decision process.
The problem of representation in the United States is exacerbrated
by the way the federal government finances water resources projects.
Since the federal government pays a large proportion of the total
cost of flood control, navigation, irrigation and pollution control
works, distributive politics tends to govern what gets done.1 I In
other words the negotiations among entities which lead to decisions
do not include any group which can speak effectively in behalf of the
general taxpayer who pays the cost. If, as in the United States, it is
decided that the goals of water development require that funds from
the national treasury must be utilized to fund water projects, some
provision must be made to represent the national treasury in the
negotiations. This requires an entity that can do more than review
the reports of the planning agencies. The entity must be capable of
making its own analysis of the alternatives and be organized to play
an active role in the negotiating process from the very beginning. A
well funded, Common Cause, type of agency appears to be needed.
IS. Mann, Conflict and CoalitionPolitical Variables Underlying Water Resource Develop.
ment in the Upper Colorado River Basin, 15 Nat. Res. J. 141 (1975); see also Mann,
PoliticalIncentives in U.S. Water Policy: RelationshipsBetween Distributiveand Regulatory
Politics,What Government Does (M. Holden Jr. & D. Dresang, eds.) (1975).
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B. Inadequacy of Information
As previously noted, the inadequacy of information has resulted in
inadequate representation of some interests in the decision process.
This inadequacy can be attributed in large part to the limited perceptions of the planning agency. Some years ago a notable example of
this limited perception occurred in the case of a planning program
for the Potomac River Basin. Control of water pollution in the reach
below Washington, D.C. was an important problem to be dealt with
along with flood control, and power development. The four alternative plans presented by the Corps of Engineers for public consideration envisaged the dilution of treated effluent through regulation of
flows by reservoirs as the means of dealing with the pollution problem. Subsequent study revealed numerous other alternatives that
would be equally effective and which could be implemented at least
as economically as the reservoir systems. This is one of the more
dramatic examples of the way the perceptions of a single planning
agency limits the alternatives for which information is provided.' 6
Another factor that leads to an inadequacy of information on
which to base decisions, is the failure to provide a mechanism for
assuring comprehensive examination of the management problem. A
number of organizations can be involved in the use of a river and the
activities of these organizations can be fully coordinated with one
another without dealing with the management problem in a comprehensive fashion. A recent study of the Lower Fraser in British
Columbia revealed this situation.'" There a substantial number of
agencies, both federal and provincial, are concerned with the control
of pollution from a variety of sources. Investigation revealed that:
a. Studies were not being undertaken which would indicate the
effects of pollutants upon the aquatic ecosystem.
b. While steps were being taken to control some sources of pollution
other important sources were being neglected.
No organization or combination of organizations feel a responsibility
for seeing that all aspects of the control problems are covered. The
conclusion of the study was that a small, politically responsible
entity should be established to see that a comprehensive study of the
aquatic ecosystem is undertaken and to complement the work of
other entities so as to assure a comprehensive attack on all sources of
pollution. It is noteworthy that this study concluded that instead of
16. R. Davis, The Range of Choice in Water Management (1968).
17. A. Dorcey, The Uncertain Future of the Lower Fraser ch. 6 (1976).
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making a major reorganization of the institutional system, the existing network should be supplemented with an entity that fills in gaps
in the existing system.
C. Ineffectiveness in Implementation
One of the major problems evident in institutional design in the
United States and Canada is the difficulty of designing implementation arrangements which achieve policy objectives. This difficulty has
been most notable where government has relied upon a regulatory
process to achieve policy objectives as in the regulation of pollution
and in the allocation of water supplies among users.
To control pollution, the United States and Canada have used
regulatory bodies to establish the quantity and strength of waste a
discharger might put into a waterway. This has resulted in the
negotiation among entities being extended into the implementation
stage. Furthermore, the regulatory body and the waste dischargers
have tended to develop a. relationship in which the regulatory body
favors the waste dischargers with the result that water quality
objectives are not met.' 8 The only solution to this type of problem
appears to be a provision for the full participation of countervailing
interests at the stage where regulations are designed and implemented. There appears to be no other way of overcoming the
propensity of a regulatory body to favor the group being regulated.
A different problem is posed by institutions utilized to allocate
water supplies to users and uses. In the development of a system of
water allocation, two issues are generally involved. One is the question of fairness; what constitutes an equitable allocation among existing potential users. The other is the question of efficiency, it is
usually a policy objective to allocate water so as to bring the largest
return to society. The literature on water law strongly suggests that
in most parts of the United States where water is scarce the transfer
of rights to use water to the most efficient uses has been inhibited by
the allocation system.' I Where water supplies are abundant inefficiencies appear to be of minor importance. The problem stems from
the fact that water flows and the supply vary from season to season
and year to year. It has been difficult to design a system which takes
into account these physical characteristics of water resources, which
is fair, and which motivates the user to utilize available supplies
20
efficiency or transfer the supply to a more efficient use.
18. See M. Holden, supra note 11.
19. L. Hartman & D. Seastone, Water Transfers: Economic Efficiency and Alternative
Institutions (1970).
20. 1. Fox, Water Supply Demand and the Law, Resources for the Future Reprint No. 15

(1960).
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AN APPROACH TO THE INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM

It has been the theme of this paper that institutions must be
designed in light of individual and organizational behavior, and
adapted to the physical and governmental environment in which they
are to be applied. Furthermore, one cannot begin with a clean slate;
some type of institutional framework exists if water services are
being provided. Therefore, instead of an institutional pattern, one
needs an approach to follow in endeavoring to strengthen a system
that exists. It is essential to recognize that there is no simple path to
improvement. Only through dissection of the system and the assessment of its performance in accord with the criteria set forth earlier
can one identify the opportunities for improvement.
In a large country it does not appear wise to think in terms of a
uniform institutional pattern for the country as a whole. While the
general governmental structure is the same for the entire country,
other variables that bear upon institutional design will differ. The
specific physical characteristics and potential of the water resource,
the sub-national governmental structure of state or provincial governments, and the interest groups that must be taken into account will
vary from region to region. While some institutional elements will be
uniform for the nation as a whole, the institutional pattern within
regions will of necessity vary from region to region. This fact is well
recognized in both the United States and Canada where the institutional arrangements vary substantially with physical and economic
conditions and state and provincial governmental structure.
It follows that institutional design must be addressed at two levels.
One must ask whether the elements that apply nationwide are appropriate instruments for the pursuit of national goals. This question
probably cannot be answered without assessing how these elements
function in a regional context. Case studies of regional situations,
therefore appear necessary in order to assess institutions that apply
nationwide. One must, in effect, dissect the operation of the interacting set of entities and rules through which decisions get made.
Such an analysis must take into account the physical characteristics
and potentials of the resource. The interests potentially affected by
development and use must be identified and the interactions of these
interests in arriving at decisions must be determined. Who participates in the decision process, what is the role of each, what is the
network of communication involved, what information is generated
as a basis for decisions?
The next step is the assessment of the process of policy and program implementation. Are decisions faithfully implemented? This
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sort of dissection provides the foundation for asking the questions
suggested by the performance criteria. Does the system generate
adequate information when potentials and problems are considered
in light of the value frameworks of the various interests in society? Is
there a feedback of experience into subsequent decisions? Are the
interests affected satisfactorily represented in the decision process?
The effort to answer questions posed by the performance criteria
may indicate spots in the institutional framework where modifications are needed. 2'
Relatively little attention has been devoted to the evaluation of
decision-making arrangements in terms of specific normative criteria.
Such an evaluation would appear essential if efforts to strengthen
institutional design are to be attacked on a systematic basis.

21. A study of this nature has been made of the Lower Fraser River in British Columbia
by Mark Sproule-Jones and Ken Peterson. A manuscript is in process of preparation.

